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Abstract 
The Syrian conflict has been ongoing for the last six years and has left the 
international community unsure of how or when it will end. Existing literature on civil 
war termination creates a framework in which we can better understand what the 
potential outcomes for the conflict will be. These outcomes are negotiated settlement 
and decisive military victory. The civil war literature indicates that the conflict is not 
likely to end in negotiated settlement due to the failure of the peace process thus far and 
that decisive military victory by the Asad government is the most likely outcome of the 
conflict. Additionally, civil war literature explains that a conflict like the Syrian conflict 
is not likely to end quickly due to domestic and international actors acting as spoilers to 
the peace process. While the international community has pushed for negotiated 
settlement, it needs to be prepared for both potential outcomes. 
This thesis argues that because a decisive military victory by the Asad 
government is the most likely outcome, the period following the conflict will not be 
peaceful. The Syrian government is likely to continue its crackdown on opposition 
groups and continue to commit human rights violations and the opposition is not likely 
to disarm peacefully. Thus, the end of a conflict does not mean the end of violence. This 
will make reconstruction extremely difficult and the ongoing refugee crisis is likely to 
continue. Therefore, the international community not only needs to be prepared for an 
Asad victory, but for the worsening of the current humanitarian crisis.
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Brief History of the Syrian Conflict 
In December 2010, mass demonstrations that would be known collectively as 
the Arab Spring began in Tunisia after the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouzizi and 
quickly spread across the Middle East. Syrians had become increasingly frustrated with 
the authoritarian Ba’th regime, dominated by the Asad family, and its refusal to allow 
for a new system of governance to emerge, whether it would be a Sharia-based 
government or democratic government was and still is an issue of debate amongst the 
opposition. The protests had different outcomes across the Arab world, but Syria’s 
revolution would result in an extremely violent and complex conflict. The Syrian civil 
war began as peaceful protests in response to the arrest and torture of several young 
boys in Dara’a. In February 2011, the boys spray-painted “The people want the fall of 
the regime” and “It’s your turn, doctor” on the wall of a school.1 The boys were tortured 
by the mukhabarat and in response people in Dara’a and other parts of Syria began to 
protest the government. These protests did not remain peaceful for long, as there were 
reports that people were killed by security forces at protests in Dara’a in March 2011.2 
Early on in the Arab Spring, Syrians felt that the revolution would end quickly 
and that civil war was not a possibility because the different religious and ethnic groups 
had been able to live together peacefully.3 President Bashar al-Asad was also optimistic 
that he would not meet the same fate as President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia 
                                                
1 Kelly McEvers. "Revisiting The Spark That Kindled The Syrian Uprising." NPR, 16 March 2012. 22 
2 "Violence erupts at protests in Syria." Violence erupts at protests in Syria - Al Jazeera English. March 
18, 2011. Accessed January 4, 2017. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/201131817214964640.html. 
3Stephen Starr. Revolt in Syria: Eye-witness to the Uprising. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015, 153-154.	
2 
due to military strength and an extremely splintered opposition.4 However, as clashes 
and violence escalated it was clear that the war would not end quickly or easily as a 
result of deteriorating religious community relations. What has resulted is a six year-
long conflict, that has divided the country and that does not seem to have a clear 
outcome, other than that Asad is likely to achieve military victory and retake most of 
the country.  
 
Figure 1. Areas of Control as of 4 April 20175 
The above map created by The Carter Center Syria Conflict Mapping Project 
shows the divisiveness that exists within the state, although on a somewhat simplistic 
level because the opposition is one group on the map. However, it does demonstrate to 
an extent how divided Syria is.  
                                                
4 Joshua Landis. "The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime Is Likely to Survive to 2013." 
Middle East Policy 19.1 (Spring 2012), 1-3. 1 August 2016. 
5 "Syria Dashboard." Syria Dashboard. 2016. Accessed 4 April, 2016. 
https://d3svb6mundity5.cloudfront.net/dashboard/index.html.	
3 
In addition to constant violence that results in civilian deaths, there have been 
reports that indicate that chemical weapons have been used in the conflict. Syria is not a 
party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. In 2013, a United Nations team “found 
“clear and convincing evidence” that Sarin gas was used in an incident that occurred on 
21 August in the Ghouta area on the outskirts of Damascus in which hundreds of people 
were reportedly killed.”6 Many in the thought that this incident would cause the 
international community to intervene militarily, invoking the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine, however it did not, despite the fact that President Barack Obama had declared 
that the Syrian government had crossed a red line by using chemical weapons; although 
this red line is often attributed to Obama, he states that the red line was one set by the 
world in the Chemical Weapons convention.7The red line and the lack of response by 
the Obama Administration to it, have caused problems for the administration because 
many feel that the president failed to intervene in Syria when he had a chance. The 
opposition and the government have accused each other of using chemical weapons.  
On 4 April 2017, there were reports that the Syrian government bombed the 
town of Khan Skeikoun in Idlib province with chemical weapons.8 This is one of the 
worst attacks by the Syrian government since the beginning of the Trump 
                                                
6 "'Clear and convincing' evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria, UN team reports." UN News 
Center. September 16, 2013. Accessed December 29, 2016. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45856#.WG1zJLYrLEY. 
7 Barack Obama and Fredrik Reinfeldt. "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Reinfeldt of 
Sweden in Joint Press Conference." The White House. September 04, 2013. Accessed December 29, 
2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/04/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-
minister-reinfeldt-sweden-joint-press-. 
; Glenn Kessler. "President Obama and the 'red line' on Syria’s chemical weapons." The Washington Post, 
September 6, 2013. Accessed December 29, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-
weapons/?utm_term=.f380a551e68d. 
8 "Massive bombardment target a hospital and kills 58 including 11 children in Khan Shekhon." Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights. April 4, 2017. Accessed April 4, 2017. 
http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=64104 
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Administration, but it appears that it will not alter the Administration’s stance that the 
Syrian people will decide whether Asad will stay or go.9 	
The conflict has possibly created one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 
21st century, with hundreds of thousands killed and millions displaced. Following the 
fall of Aleppo to the Syrian government, United States ambassador to the United 
Nations Samantha Power best explained the humanitarian crisis and many actors’ 
responses to it. In particular, Power was directing her blame at Russian President 
Vladmir Putin, as he could possibly influence the Asad regime to reach a peace 
agreement and because the Russian government has had its role in airstrikes and other 
operations that have resulted in the civilian deaths.   
Your forces and proxies are carrying out these crimes. Your barrel bombs and mortars 
and air strikes have allowed the militia in Aleppo to encircle tens of thousands of 
civilians in your ever-tightening noose. It is your noose. Three member states of the 
U.N. contributing to a noose around civilians. It should shame you. Instead, by all 
appearances, it is emboldening you. You are plotting your next assault. Are you truly 
incapable of shame? Is there literally nothing that can shame you? Is there no act of 
barbarism against civilians, no execution of a child that gets under your skin, that just 
creeps you out a little bit? Is there nothing you will not lie about or justify?10 
 
The international community failed to act early on and chose not to implement the 
responsibility to protect doctrine in order to prevent the atrocities occurring in Syria. 
This has been one of the major questions of the war; why has no one acted to stop it? 
Despite numerous peace proposals, the international community, particularly Russia 
and the United States, and the Syrian people seem to be unable to reach an agreement 
                                                
9 Anne Barnard. "Gas Attack Is Said to Kill Dozens in Syria." The New York Times, April 4, 2017. 
Accessed April 4, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/middleeast/syria-gas-
attack.html?_r=0. 
10 Samantha Power. "Remarks at a UN Security Council Emergency Briefing on Syria" United States 
Mission to the United Nations. December 13, 2016. Accessed December 26, 2016. 
https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7607. 
5 
on how to stop the killing. 	
As Charles Glass explained, “the battle for Aleppo is a war for Syria itself;” 
meaning whoever wins the battle for Aleppo will likely be the victor in the conflict.11 
December 2016 marked a turning point for the almost six year long war—the Syrian 
government backed by Russian forces was able to retake the strategic city of Aleppo. In 
2012, opposition forces captured neighborhoods in the eastern part of the city and it 
would take four years for the government to retake control of the opposition stronghold. 
The Syrian government was able to achieve success due to aerial bombardments from 
the Russian government. The battle ended when the opposition lost control of eastern 
Aleppo and a deal was reached to allow opposition fighters and families to leave so that 
many could receive much needed medical attention.  
The fall of Aleppo does not mark the end of the conflict as the opposition is still 
reluctant to let Asad maintain power and the end of the war means a political solution, 
not just a military one, needs to be reached. Ceasefires have thus far been very weak 
and have not ended the violence. Despite gaining control over Aleppo, armed groups 
still control other parts of the country and ISIS continues to be a problem. Additionally, 
as long as the international interference continues, it will be challenging for Syrians to 
work together to create a solution that is best for Syrians, and not what is best for the 
United States or Russia. A political solution is thus far more challenging than a military 
one as it requires many groups to make compromises that they are unlikely to make.  
 Following the fall of Aleppo, a countrywide ceasefire backed by Russia and 
Turkey was declared on 29 December 2016. As in many of the previous ceasefire deals, 
                                                
11 Charles Glass. Syria burning: A Short History of a Catastrophe. London: Verso, 2016. 121. 
6 
this one excludes jihadist groups, such as ISIS.12 The FSA says that this deal does not 
include the YPG too.13 Therefore, despite being a countrywide truce, “that really only 
covers the areas where the sides who have signed up to the truce have a presence.”14 
The deal also states that peace talks will be held in Kazakhstan in a month if the 
ceasefire holds. The YPG would not take part in the peace talks since they are excluded 
from the ceasefire agreement. 	
Despite the implementation of a ceasefire, violence has continued in the country, 
as is the case following many of the previous ceasefire agreements. Many parts of the 
country have seen a decrease in violence, but there has been ongoing fighting between 
pro and anti government forces near Damascus.15 The Turkish government has urged 
the government and its supporters to end the fighting, which threaten the success of the 
potential peace talks.16 The ongoing violence weakens the ability of the ceasefire and 
potential peace talks, which places Syria in an ongoing cycle of failed ceasefires and 
peace talks.  
 While all parties to the conflict are likely guilty of human rights violations, the 
Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons, barrel bombs, torture, and other forms 
of violence have contributed to its ability to be successful in the conflict. However, it is 
also likely that these extreme forms of violence will hinder peace efforts after the 
conflict is over, as opposition groups will continue to be wary of the Syrian government 
                                                
12 "Syria conflict: Ceasefire agreed, backed by Russia and Turkey." BBC News, December 29, 2016. 
Accessed December 29, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38460127. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 "Turkey warns Syria talks at risk over truce violations." Jordan Times, January 4, 2017. Accessed 
January 4, 2017. http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/turkey-warns-syria-talks-risk-over-truce-
violations. 
16 Ibid. 
7 
and may continue to attack the government and vice versa. 
This paper will answer the following questions: why has the Syrian conflict 
gone on for so long? And, why has Asad remained in power? In order to answer these 
questions, I will address the two major dimensions of the case: 1. The domestic actors 
and their goals for the outcome of the conflict, 2. the international actors and their goals 
for the outcome of the conflict, 3. Analyze these factors using existing literature on civil 
war termination to determine why it has not ended and what the possible outcomes of 
the conflict are. The literature indicates that the Syrian conflict is not likely to end in the 
near future and is unlikely to end in negotiated settlement, and will therefore end in a 
decisive military victory by the Asad government. This outcome will not bring peace to 
Syria immediately, as it is likely that the Syrian government will continue to crack 
down on the opposition to prevent future uprisings. This means Syria will most likely 
be unstable for many years to come. 
Literature Review on Weak States and Civil Wars 
While many states can witness civil war, Fearon and Latin explain “weak states are so 
much more civil war prone” as weak states allow for opposition groups to become 
viable.17 The Middle East, a region comprised of very weak states, is extremely 
vulnerable to civil war, and while the details of each civil war that has taken place in the 
region are different, they share many similarities that can provide lessons for 
understanding current and future civil wars in the region. The following literature will 
be used to help understand the complexities of the Syrian conflict, as well as the 
potential outcomes. 
                                                
17 James D. Fearon., and David D. Laitin. "Civil war termination." In Conference paper. 2007., 8. 
8 
 Prior to analyzing weak state and civil war literature it is important to define the 
concept of a state. Max Weber states that the state “claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical forces within a given territory.”18 Therefore, a state is a 
sovereign entity that has control over a territory.  
Second, it is essential to understand weak states. A key element of scholarship 
that focuses on states in the developing world is what to call these states. These states, 
while often referred to as weak or fragile states, are also commonly called ‘quasi-
states.’ Robert Jackson, who created a foundation for the study of ‘quasi-states,’ argues 
that while these states tend to be former colonial states in the developing world and 
have sovereignty, they are considered ‘quasi-states’ due to the fact that they “lack 
institutional features of sovereign states” because of this, states tend to be unstable and 
prone to failure.19 Despite being weak or unstable, many of these states continue to 
exist. These characteristics are often an aftereffect of colonialism and poor state 
planning by colonial powers and the governments put in place by those colonial powers. 
In more recent literature, Stanislawski puts these states in three categories: “as-if 
states,” “almost states,” “black spots,” and “states-within-states”.20 These categories 
differ from ‘quasi-states’ because they include sovereign states, groups that hope to gain 
independence, and groups outside of state control, such as criminal or terrorist 
organizations. While Jackson’s ‘quasi-state’ is still extremely relevant today, 
                                                
18 Max Weber. "Politics as a Vocation." (1968), 1. 
 
19 Robert H. Jackson. Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. New York 
City: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 21. 
20 Bartosz H. Stanislawski. "Para-States, Quasi-States, and Black Spots: Perhaps Not States, But Not 
“Ungoverned Territories,” Either." International Studies Review10, no. 2 (2008), 371. 
9 
Stanislawski’s categories are more useful for understanding states like Syria where 
“black spots” such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and “almost-states” like the 
Kurdish controlled territories exist. In the study of ‘quasi-states’ in the 21st century it is 
important that we include these different entities in our analysis.  
Jackson’s research points to ‘quasi-states’ as being a phenomenon in the 
developing world. ‘Quasi-states’ and their subsequent failure or collapse may also be 
linked more specifically to their geographical region.21 This indicates that “functional 
links between sub-state territories in different states are instrumental for understanding 
the territorial extent of state failure regions.”22 Therefore, simply being a ‘quasi-state’ 
does not indicate whether or not they will succeed or fail and these ‘quasi-states need to 
be examined in terms of their region as well to understand state identity and where state 
weakness exists. In cases where state weakness is caused by regional issues, fixing 
domestic issues will not necessarily solve problems as regional influence could cause 
the state to become unstable again. Robert Bates, by discussing the impact of conflict on 
the economy, provides a sample of this type of analysis of the patterns of state failure in 
Africa in “Political Conflict and State Failure.”23 Regional analysis of ‘quasi-states,’ 
state failure, and state collapse is critical for understanding state collapse in the Middle 
East, as the lack of stability in several states can lead to a larger regional collapse. 
Pollack and Walter explain that the destabilizing effects of civil wars have an effect on 
                                                
21 Stefan Wolff. “The regional dimensions of state failure.” Review of International Studies 37, no. 03 
(2011), 953. 
22 Ibid., 961. 
23 Robert H. Bates. Political Conflict and State Failure. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
10 
the Middle East and not just within state borders.24 They also argue that the factors that 
cause civil wars across the Middle East are fairly similar, indicating that the 
international community can use scholarship on these wars to better understand what 
causes them and how to end them.25 
Many groups involved in civil wars or that exist in weak states hope to achieve 
statehood. In the case of Syria, groups such as ISIS and the Kurds desire independent 
states, while the Syrian government aspires to keep the Syrian state as is. Milliken and 
Krausse argue that “the aspiration to viable statehood…rests on a deeply ingrained 
assumption about appropriate forms of political organization and order,” indicating that 
Jackson’s title of ‘quasi-state’ is suitable for developing states in the developing world 
because they do not fit the modern idea of the state.26 They argue that Jackson is 
explaining that we should not just question why and how these states fail, but “how and 
why they exist or persist at all.”27  Thus, as Stanislawski indicates, we should not limit 
our analysis of weak states and ‘quasi-states’ to the traditional concept of states and we 
should include all entities that aspire for independence or have de facto independence in 
our analysis of developing states and their success or failure because states are not the 
only political entities that make up the post-colonial world. This is evident in the cases 
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and the Kurds. These groups are working in 
different ways to gain a state, but are currently not recognized as such.  
                                                
24 Kenneth M. Pollack, and Barbara F. Walter. "Escaping the Civil War Trap in the Middle East." The 
Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (2015), 29. 
25 Ibid., 30. 
26 Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause. "State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, 
Lessons and Strategies." Development and Change 33, no. 5 (2002), 762-763. 
27 Ibid, 763. 
11 
Like ‘quasi-states,’ the concept of “failed states” is an idea that emerged in the 
1990s with the case of Somalia.28 Failed states became a security issue after the 
September 11 attacks when the Western world began to focus on Afghanistan as a failed 
state due to the fact that al-Qaeda was able to operate within the state.29 Charles Call 
explains that scholars and practitioners have struggled to come up with criteria to 
determine whether or not a state is failing, failed, or collapsed.30 Rotberg may provide 
us with the best indicators of what a failed state looks like. These characteristics range 
from having civil war, seeing a decline in GDP per capita, to loss of control of 
territory.31 Thus, just as in the discussion of nomenclature for weak states in the 
developing world, there is not wide consensus on what to call states witnessing failure. 
As other literature will indicate, there is more consensus on characteristics and the 
processes of state failure and collapse than precise terminology. In the context of the 
Syria case, the state is failing as it is currently witnessing civil war and the state has lost 
control over territory. 
A common theme in states that are failing or that experience civil wars is the 
deep divisions between ethnic or religious groups. As in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Syria, and 
many other cases a major contributing factor for state collapse is that society is divided 
and “elites, who are alienated from and/or discriminated against by the state (or 
perceive themselves to be so),” manipulate tensions between ethnic or religious 
                                                
28 Charles T. Call. "The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'." Third World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (2008), 1492. 
29 Ibid, 1491. 
30 Ibid., 1494. 
31 Robert I. Rotberg. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2004, 5-9. 
12 
groups.32 Jackson also argues that the elite class in these states is narrow and 
independence from colonial rulers was unlikely to improve the lives of citizens because 
the elite class often continues to rule in an authoritarian or oppressive manner.33 These 
elite ruling classes often emerge with the creation of a national identity and failures in 
state building.34 James Fearon and David Laitin argue that neither ethnic nor religious 
grievances or ethnic diversity are the root causes of civil war, but instead sometimes 
these grievances are a product of civil war.35  Civil war can cause state failure and in 
some cases, the breakup of the state.  
Much of the literature on ‘quasi-states’ points to the failure of the protection of 
human rights as an example of the failure of ‘quasi-state’ government to provide for 
their citizens.36  This can be linked to the fact that an elite class often controls the 
government because they often limit the freedoms of other religious or ethnic groups in 
order to maintain control. The failure to protect human rights also often leads to the 
government losing legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and the international 
community, which is a factor that can lead to state failure. Additionally, as previously 
discussed, the failure of functions of the state such as the protection of human rights can 
lead to state failure. This creates a cycle that weak states can get stuck in and cannot 
easily escape. 
                                                
32 Badredine Arfi. "State Collapse in a New Theoretical Framework: The Case of 
Yugoslavia." International Journal of Sociology 28, no. 3 (1998), 16. 
33 Robert H. Jackson. Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World., 21 
34 Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause. "State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, 
Lessons and Strategies,"  759 
35 James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), 88. 
36 Neil A. Englehart. "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights." Journal of Peace Research 46, 
no. 2 (2009), 164. 
13 
While there is limited literature on state collapse and successor states in the 21st 
century, recent scholarship has discussed the role that non-state actors play in state 
collapse and the creation of successor states. This scholarship is extremely relevant 
today due to the rise in non-state actors such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) or al-Qaeda in Somalia and Yemen.37 In the post-9/11 world, state failure has 
often been seen as a reason for the success of terrorist organizations because the state, 
and sometimes the larger region, lacks the ability to control its own territory, whether 
that is all of it or part of it.38 Jackson touches on this in his discussion of positive versus 
negative sovereignty. However, Bridget Coggins warns us that we should be careful in 
blaming state failure for increased terrorism. Failed states do show an increase in 
terrorism, but state failure is not the only factor.39 The fact that state failure provides an 
environment that is ideal for the rise of international crime or terrorist organizations 
makes failed or weak states an important issue of international security, not only from 
the perspective of the United States, but the world. The securitization of failed states 
can also be seen as coming from a Western perspective since much of the concern over 
failed states being a potential breeding ground more terrorist organizations originated 
after the September 11 attacks. As Morten Boas and Kathleen Jennings explain, the 
failed states are sometimes labeled as failures based on whether or not the state is 
considered a threat.40  
                                                
37 Ioannis Mantzikos. "Somalia and Yemen: The Links between Terrorism and State Failure." Digest of 
Middle East Studies 20, no. 2 (2011): 242-60. 
38 Stefan Wolff. "The Regional Dimensions of State Failure," 961. 
39 Bridget L. Coggins. "Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–
2008)." Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 3 (2015), 477. 
40 Morten Boas and Kathleen Jennings. “‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats of Opportunities?” 
Globalizations 4, no. 4 (2007): 475-485.  
14 
Civil wars are complex events that are often followed by periods of instability. 
According to Barbara Walter, there are three reasons why rationalists believe negotiated 
settlements are rarely the outcome of civil wars because “negotiated settlements are so 
rare because the benefits of winning a civil war are so much greater…,, domestic stakes 
are either difficult or impossible to divide, and this makes a shared settlement 
infeasible…,[and] extremist demands, ambitious leaders, poor communication, fear, and 
erratic outside aid limit the range of tolerable solutions and make mutually acceptable 
bargains difficult to locate.”41 However, Walter says that the ideational schools of 
thought believe that civil wars are less rationally motivated and “involve deep issues of 
ethnic and cultural identity, of recognition, and of participation that are usually denied 
to ethnic minorities, in addition to ... other values that are not negotiable.”42 The Syrian 
conflict fits into both schools of thought as so much is at stake for all parties and deep 
societal divisions have made a negotiated settlement nearly impossible.  
Additionally, the literature demonstrates that civil wars are not only difficult to 
end, but generally last longer than interstate wars.43 Civil wars last longer for a variety 
of reasons. One of the primary factors is international support to opposition groups and 
the government; if there is international support, civil wars are likely to last even 
longer.44 Not only does foreign support cause civil wars to last longer, it also can ensure 
military victory.45  Sawyer et al. argue that “highly fungible external support has a 
                                                
41 Walter, Barbara F. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." International Organization 51, no. 3 
(1997), 342. 
42 Ibid. 
43 James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin. "Civil War Termination." In Conference paper. 2007., 2.  
44 Ibid., 20. 
45 Ibid., 29.  
15 
negative effect on the likelihood of a conflict ending.”46 They explain that there are 
various types of support, such as weapons, intelligence, troop support, and territorial 
and that some types of external support are more likely to have an effect on civil war 
termination than others.47  
This literature on weak states and civil war termination provides scholars with 
an important understanding of what weak states are and why civil wars end or take 
years to end. Since civil wars share many of the same features, this literature can help us 
to better comprehend why the Syrian state functions in the way it does, the complexities 
of the Syrian conflict, and why the international community has failed to end it as of 
2017, or the beginning of the seventh year of conflict. As this paper will explain, the 
literature indicates that the Syrian conflict will last much longer and is not likely to end 
in a negotiated settlement.  
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Chapter 2: Domestic Actors 
A major reason the conflict has been going on is the number of actors within 
Syria. The opposition, which includes moderate groups, jihadist groups, such as Daesh, 
and the Kurds, is extremely splintered and lacks a cohesive goal for the future of Syria. 
On the other hand, the Asad government has the clear goal of remaining power and 
regaining control over the entirety of Syria. The way the international community has 
contributed to the length and complexity of the conflict will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
This chapter will discuss the strengths and weaknesses as well as goals of the 
following actors: the Asad government and the opposition, which includes groups 
deemed “moderate” by the West, jihadist groups, and the Kurds. Since the opposition 
contains thousands of groups, it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the goals of 
each individual group, thus this division will provide a broad overview of what the 
different aspects of the opposition desire. As civil war literature demonstrates, a large 
number of actors can prolong a conflict and can hinder efforts at negotiated settlement 
due to a lack of unity regarding the goals for the future of the state. 
The Asad Government 
Hafez al-Asad and the Ba’ath Party 
To understand why the protests began and why they resulted in violent conflict, 
it is important to understand the reign of Hafez al-Asad and the Ba’ath Party, which has 
defined Syrian society since the 1970s. Hafez al-Asad’s governing style and personality 
were shaped by his upbringing in the poor Alawite communities that were often 
oppressed by the French colonists. Asad, the first Syrian leader from the peasant class, 
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declared in a speech in 1980, “I am first and last…a peasant and the son of a peasant... 
No matter how far the past sinks away, it is necessary to keep these images alive in our 
minds…for what we endured forms an essential part of the way we view things and of 
the foundation on which we build the present and the future.”48 Asad, as described by 
his biographer, Patrick Seale, is the Syrian Charles de Gaulle, as he implemented ideas 
of Arab nationalism and socialism and modernization policies.49 However, Asad, like 
the French, manipulated religious groups and ruled in an authoritarian manner.50 
Despite the fact that the Alawite leader was able to manipulate groups, which 
perpetuated the understanding that Alawites were better off than Sunnis; however, in 
reality, Alawites are not better off economically.51 Despite this, “Syrians seemingly 
lived without outward reference to religious difference. Sunni, Shia, Christian, and 
Alawite had friendships and did business.”52 Despite Asad’s manipulations of religious 
groups, sectarian tensions are not necessarily the root cause of the Syrian civil war, but 
may be a product of continuous elite exploitation and grievances created by the civil 
war.53    People have started to identify by sect out of fear, just as people did during the 
Lebanese Civil War and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.54 While literature on weak 
states explains that elite classes often are the creators of sectarian and ethnic divisions, 
in the case of Syria, sectarian conflict is primarily a product of the conflict.  
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Alawites are mainly concentrated along the coast in the governorates of Latakia 
and Tartous. They make up approximately 12% of the population and are on offshoot of 
Shia Islam. Some believe they are not Muslims, however, Syrian Alawites insist they 
are, as the Syrian constitution states that the President must be a Muslim.55 Sunni 
Muslims make up a majority of the population, but have not ruled over the country and 
have been oppressed by the Alawites throughout their rule. One of the most infamous 
events of Hafez al-Asad’s rule was the massacre of Sunni Muslims in Hama in 1982 in 
order to stop an uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood. This event foreshadowed how 
Bashar al-Asad would respond to the uprisings in 2011. Thomas Friedman credits this 
response to tribe-like politics. Due to this attitude, Asad “understood that if the Sunni 
Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to seize control of even one neighborhood in Hama , 
then the Alawites' blood would be in the water and all their other opponents in Syria 
would be feeding on them within days.”56 Therefore, he felt that he had to that “was 
devastating enough to be felt in the gut of every Syrian.”57 Bashar would use this same 
attitude to respond to the Arab Spring, as he understood that compromise would only 
lead to a loss of power.  
Under Asad’s rule, Damascus grew rapidly, rural areas saw economic growth, 
women were elected to parliament, and the Alawite community saw improvements in 
their lives. However, the state was continuously plagued with economic difficulties, 
diplomatic battles, war with Israel, corruption and human rights abuses. Under the Asad 
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government “there was no truly independent judiciary, no freedom of information, 
association or expression, and no autonomous university.”58 People lived in fear that 
they would be arrested and tortured by security forces.59  Despite the fact that some saw 
improvements over French mandate rule, Asad’s oppressive rule frustrated and angered 
many.	
Bashar al-Asad and Pro-Government Actors 
Bashar al-Asad became President of Syria following the death of his father in 
2000 and Syrians were hopeful that political change would follow.60 However, his 
election, which occurred because of demands by the public to have an election, was 
simply a formality and his rule would be a continuation of his father’s. His inaugural 
speech in July 2000 promised economic reform and stated that the state had been a 
major obstacle to economic development and therefore Syria should shift away from the 
past in order to eliminate obstacles to development.61 Asad formed discussion groups 
early on, but within several months the discussion groups were shut down and he began 
to arrest those who opposed him and the human rights situation had not made many 
improvements.62 Asad began to follow in his father’s footsteps, by placing people close 
to him in powerful positions. Some claim that Bashar’s brother, Maher, the head of the 
Syrian army and commander of the Presidential Guard, discouraged him from making 
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political reform, but it is clear that Asad wanted to maintain power and free and fair 
elections might limit his ability to do so. This instilled a sense that Syrian institutions 
were based on loyalty to Asad rather than to state institutions and laws itself, which is 
something that occurs often in weak states. In the years prior to the civil war there had 
been pressure on Asad by the United States to allow opposition parties to form and the 
opposition stated that they wanted to learn from the lessons of Iraq and have this 
process occur without war or intervention.63   When the protests began in 2011, Asad 
once again promised change, but this attempt at reform came far too late. Asad ended 
emergency laws that had been in place for decades and said nothing else about long-
term changes.64 
The friendly relations, or at least the appearance of friendly relations, between 
religious groups began to collapse as a result of Asad’s continuation of authoritarian 
rule and because of factors relating to the conflict. Religion likely became a centerpiece 
of the conflict because of external support by Sunni and Shia states that will be 
discussed later. This support made opposition groups prioritize religion as part of their 
identity in order to receive support from particular countries. 
Who Supports the Asad Government? 
Within Syria, Asad’s main supporters, aside from the government and the Syrian 
Armed Forces, are minority groups, such as Alawites and Christians. The Asad 
government has had a history of protecting the interests of other minority groups, so it 
has been in the best interests of these groups to maintain relations with the government. 
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Additionally, many minority groups fear a takeover by radical Islamist groups and have 
turned to the Asad government for protection. Armed groups, such as Sootoro, or the 
Syriac Protection Office, that operates in Qashmali in northern Syria, have been 
involved in clashes with the opposition and ISIS.65 However, Asad receives much of its 
support from external actors, such as Russia and Hezbollah. As these groups all have 
the goal of keeping Asad in power, his support is much more unified than that of the 
opposition. This has contributed to Asad’s military success in the conflict. 
Goals of the Asad Government 
In 2016, Bashar al-Asad proclaimed that he would retake the entirety of Syria 
“without hesitation.”66 In sum, Asad hopes for his government to survive. To be 
successful, Asad will need to continue on his path to military victory and take action 
after the end of the civil war to ensure he can suppress the opposition and maintain 
stability in the country. While Asad may succeed in doing so with regards to 
opposition-held areas in Western Syria, as is clear from his recent military success, he 
may face more of a challenge when it comes to retaking territory from ISIS. 
Additionally, since ISIS is as much an ideology as it is an organization, the Syrian 
government may be able to retake territory, but it might not necessarily be able to 
prevent future attacks by the group across ISIS. Finally,  as will be explained in the 
following chapter, Asad’s goals are reinforced with help from Russia, Iran, and foreign 
armed groups, such as Hezbollah, who all have stakes in keeping Asad in power. 
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The Opposition 
The opposition in Syria encompasses all those that are opposed to the Syrian 
government, which can include the Kurdish groups, moderate groups, and extremist 
groups like Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. Opposition groups are divided on ideological lines. 
Since there are thousands of opposition groups, with new groups forming and old ones 
breaking apart, it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess each group, this section will 
discuss the opposition as broad entities, such as the Kurds, the Syrian National Council, 
and extremists groups in order to explain the splintered goals of the opposition and why 
there is a lack of unification within the opposition.  
The Syrian National Coalition 
The Syrian National Coalition (SNC) was formed in 2012 in order to unite the 
opposition and work towards a plan for political transition. The SNC hoped to be able to 
“an important role in liaising between the needs of the Syrian people and the 
international community.”67 The United States considers the primary opposition entity 
to be the SNC, which aims to “do everything in its power to reach the goal of 
overthrowing the Assad regime and bring victory to the revolution both inside and 
outside of Syria” and to establish an internationally recognized government.68 The SNC 
is considered to be the primary opposition group as the United States views it as more 
moderate than others. The SNC is generally discussed as the opposition because it has a 
wider representation, its history can be traced, and it has received international 
recognition, but it is by no means the only opposition group, nor does it have much 
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legitimacy because it is not the only group.69 The SNC maintains that Syria’s 
sovereignty must be preserved and therefore “struggle is against the Assad regime, not 
against the State of Syria. In this regard, we will preserve state institutions and 
structures, but reorganize them for the purpose of protecting the state and its employees 
who are not corrupt and have no blood on their hands, including military and security 
personnel.”70 This indicates that the SNC does not want to work with Asad in 
establishing a post-conflict government, but that they will do everything they can to 
preserve the Syrian state. 
While the SNC is primarily a political entity, it did oversee the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) in the early days of the conflict. The FSA was formed by defectors from 
the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), which the United States views as a moderate group in the 
conflict. However, as the conflict has progressed, the FSA’s identity has changed. The 
name FSA has been used “mostly as a term for the armed uprising in general” since 
many militias have self-declared themselves as part of the FSA, but it has also been 
used to refer to “to army defectors (ex-Baathists), non-ideological fighters, and more 
moderate Islamists.”71 Therefore, it can be challenging to describe the FSA as an 
organization, since it lacks organization and the term is often used to refer to a variety 
of different actors. Additionally, this demonstrates that even within what many consider 
to be a unified opposition group, there is a great deal of division. 
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The Failure of the Moderate Opposition 
The moderate opposition in Syria failed to unite and be a cohesive force that 
could remove Asad from power. In part, this was because “the United States’ actions 
haven’t matched its rhetoric.” The United States began their support of the opposition 
two years into the war, after extremist groups had begun to develop. The United States 
was reluctant to provide the opposition with weapons and it could not prevent 
“moderate” groups from working with radical groups like Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. 
The SNC was formed after the United States and other countries pressured the 
opposition to unite. However, the SNC failed to represent all opposition groups, 
including Islamist factions.72 Since its creation, the SNC has failed to unite on a variety 
of issues, including Kurdish rights and how to respond to violence by the Syrian 
government.73 These issues, including the United States reluctance to arm the moderate 
opposition, resulted in the failure to create a cohesive, moderate opposition that could 
prove to be successful in forcing Asad from power. 
Extremist Groups: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and Jabhat al-Nusra 
Syria has traditionally been a moderate state, however, the conflict has 
contributed to the radicalization of the state. Nader Hashemi, the director of the Center 
for Middle East Studies at the University of Denver argues that the conflict itself and 
the ideological battle that is taking place across the Middle East led to the radicalization 
of groups. Hashemi says that in conflict, “you don’t produce liberal, democratic 
opinion. You produce the antithesis of it: an environment that reflects the social 
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conditions of chaos and anarchy.”74 Additionally, there has been a rise in various forms 
of radical Islamism since the Arab Spring. The development of radical groups in Syria 
began because opportunities for political change began to diminish and “human-rights 
violations and repressions [fed] into a narrative of radical extremism and they [were 
able to] undermine the prospects for more democratic and more moderate expressions 
of political Islam.”75 Extremist groups, especially Sunni groups, “offer a simplistic 
political platform” and have had more success in battle than moderate groups, which 
has contributed to their popularity.76 
Groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Jabhat Fatah al-
Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) have contributed to the complicated nature of the 
conflict by further dividing the opposition. These groups are what Stanislawski refers to 
as “black spots,” and in some senses, “almost-states” due to the nature of ISIS’ goals to 
create an Islamic state.77  Groups like ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham threaten the 
stability of the state and, like the rest of the opposition, the legitimacy of the 
government.  
ISIS, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, emerged out of post-war Iraq, but the 
organization became associated with the Syrian conflict in 2014 when they declared a 
caliphate and quickly took control of cities across Iraq and Syria.78 The organization 
quickly gained attention as it beheaded western journalists, slaughtered Yazidis, and 
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began to recruit young adults from all over the world. ISIS has also played a role in 
spreading the conflict beyond the borders of Syria. Its popularity around the world and 
the fear many people have of the group due to attacks such as those in Paris (13 
November 2015) and Berlin (19 December 2016) perpetrated by ISIS fighters or 
sympathizers has caused much of the world to focus on the threat of transnational 
terrorism and its role in Syria and Iraq, rather than to focus on atrocities committed by 
the Asad government within Syria’s borders. ISIS appealed to Syrians and Iraqis 
because it provides a source of leadership, employment, and resources that many 
citizens lacked because of state weakness.79 The elimination of ISIS is a major point of 
contention in the international community, because many are unsure if removing Asad 
will create greater instability in the country and allow for ISIS to gain more territory 
and power because it may create a power vacuum. 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, led by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani began as an affiliate of 
al-Qaeda in Iraq.80 The group was originally known as Jabhat al-Nusra, but changed its 
name in 2016 because the group cut ties with al-Qaeda in an attempt to dissociate itself 
from al-Qaeda, to be removed from the US terror watch list, and to rebrand the group so 
it would be considered a revolutionary group rather than a jihadist group.81 These 
efforts have thus far been unsuccessful as the United States still views it as a terrorist 
organization.  
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Groups such as ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham hope to remove the Asad 
government and establish an Islamic state. For ISIS, “the caliphate represents the onset 
of a new era of “might and dignity” for the Muslims.”82 This ideology has made 
Islamist groups extremely successful, not only in Syria, but around the world. 
Additionally, Islamist groups have worked to achieve their goals of establishing a state 
by “establishing an efficient and well-disciplined structure for the distribution of food 
and medicine,” as well as providing governance and providing people with services that 
the Syrian government has not been able to provide.83 
The Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces 
The Kurds differ from other opposition groups in that they are ethnically, rather 
than religiously united and have the goal of building an independent Kurdistan. The 
Kurdish population across the Middle East has been vying for its own independent 
Kurdistan carved out of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq and the Kurdish population of Syria 
became “a burgeoning center of newly empowered Kurdish nationalism and autonomy 
due to the forces set forth by the civil war.”84 Early in the conflict, the various Kurdish 
groups called for greater rights within in Syria including recognition as citizens, the 
right to their language and culture, and some political control, or autonomy in Kurdish 
areas.85   These interests evolved, leading Kurdish leadership to discuss the creation of 
Rojava, short for Rojavayê Kurdistanê (Western Kurdistan), or officially The 
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Democratic Federal System of Northern Syria, a Kurdish state in northern Syria after 
the success the SDF had in recapturing Manbij from ISIS in 2016.86  The second name 
is used to demonstrate that Syrian Kurds only aspire to have autonomy, rather than 
independence. However, it may be the case that like Iraqi Kurdish leaders, their actual 
aspirations are independence, with autonomy being a step in that direction. 
In Syria, the Kurds have been discriminated against since before Hafiz al-Asad 
took power because the prior leaders did not trust them.87 Some Kurds were denied 
citizenship in the Hasaka census that took place in 1962, which made it challenging for 
them to get jobs, receive higher education or healthcare.88 The census took place in one 
day in the province of Hasaka in an effort to identify Kurds that had illegally entered 
Syria and obtained citizenship. To prove they were legal citizens, people had to provide 
proof of residency prior to 1945.89 The census only affected Kurds in the region and left 
between 120,000 and 150,000 Kurds stateless.90 However, the civil war has enabled the 
Kurds to experiment with democratic governance, that encourages ethnic and gender 
balances.91 It is unlikely though, that the Kurds will be successful in seceding as the 
area they live in is not strictly a Kurdish area because “large numbers of Arabs were 
deliberately settled in areas with large Kurdish populations through land reclamation 
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projects.”92 Additionally, the Kurds have their own political divisions and Turkey 
strongly objects to an independent Kurdish area. 
The Kurds, under the name People’s Protection Unit (YPG), have fought against 
the Syrian government as well as ISIS and other opposition groups. The YPG has been 
extremely successful against ISIS and has received support from the United States 
because of this. The YPG has traditionally allied with the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF), a militia made up of Arabs and Kurds. The United States wants to use Kurdish 
success and the SDF “as an incubator to breed Sunni Arab militias able to take over 
where Kurdish territory ends and push deep into Islamic State’s heartland, which is in 
the Sunni Arab tribal region that connects Syria with Iraq.”93 However, it is not clear 
that the Kurds share this goal. 
Conclusions 
As the civil war literature indicates, the splintered nature of the domestic actors 
in the Syrian conflict are a primary reason the conflict has gone on for six years and will 
likely last even longer.94 Asad’s government has had more success due to the unity of 
support he has received both domestically and internationally. The splintered nature of 
the opposition and the fighting amongst the groups makes it lack the legitimacy needed 
to be a viable alternative to the Asad government. “Disunity, power struggles, and lack 
of direction have characterized the opposition, and half-hearted international backers 
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with conflicting agendas have deepened the divides within the opposition.”95 To be 
successful, an insurgency must have strong unity of effort and with disorganization and 
a lack of agreement on what Syria’s future should look like, the opposition’s efforts are 
weak. Thus, the nature of the opposition has contributed to the length of the conflict, 
and as civil war literature explains, has caused international actors to get involved in the 
conflict and further complicate the dynamics of the conflict.96  
While many blame the international community for being what civil war 
literature calls, “spoilers” or “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from 
negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to 
undermine attempts to achieve it,” the domestic actors also fit into this category.97 The 
opposition and the government have made military victory their priority, rather than 
working towards a negotiated peace. 
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Chapter 3: International Involvement  
For much of its history, Syria has been the center of international involvement in 
the Middle East due to its strategic position. During the Cold War, the United States and 
the Soviet Union competed for influence over Syria. Mohammed Ayoob argues that the 
Syrian conflict shares many characteristics with the Arab Cold War, except in that Iran 
has introduced a sectarian (Shia versus Sunni) aspect to it.98 Major powers such as the 
United States and Russia have become involved and many countries in Europe are 
indirectly affected by the conflict due to the massive influx of Syrian refugees. The 
proxy war that is occurring between anti-Asad and pro-Asad powers has complicated 
the war and made it much more challenging for there to be an end to the conflict. The 
international actors involved in the conflict have armed their proxies enough so that 
they would not lose the war, but not enough to win. This has fueled the conflict and 
encouraged groups to keep fighting, rather than pursue negotiated settlement. 
This chapter will discuss the involvement and goals of the primary international 
actors: the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia and will then provide 
an overview of the peace process thus far (2011-April 2017) to demonstrate how 
negotiated settlement has failed to solve the conflict and is not the likely outcome for 
the conflict, as civil war literature demonstrates. 
Russia 
Russia has been a long-time ally of the Asad government. Hafez-al Asad first travelled 
to the Soviet Union in 1958 while he was an officer in the Syrian air force in order to 
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take a course on how to fly MiG-15s and MiG-17s at night.99 Asad worked to develop a 
relationship with Russia and under Bashar al-Asad, Russia became Syria’s biggest arms 
supplier.100 Russia benefits from Syria as it is an important intelligence post. However, 
much of Russia’s support for Syria has been because of Western involvement in the 
Middle East. The Kremlin “seeing uprisings against authoritarian leaders as American 
conspiracies.”101 If Russia allowed Asad to be removed from power, it could be 
perceived as if they are conceding to Western, more specifically, American pressure. 
Russia’s involvement in Syria has also proved to distract the West from its involvement 
in the Ukraine.102 Russia is also motivated to fight Islamist groups like ISIS as it has 
faced an increased threat from jihadist groups within Russia. Russia is concerned that if 
ISIS succeeds in Syria, that this will inspire Chechens who have joined the group.103 
Thus, it is in Russia’s interest to keep its ally in power in order to maintain influence in 
the region, protect its interests abroad, and to eliminate jihadist influence within Russian 
borders. 
Russia has showed continued support for the Syrian government since the 
beginning of the conflict, commonly in the form of aerial bombardments that 
indiscriminately target civilians. Russia’s staunch support of the Asad government has 
exacerbated tensions between the United States and Russia. However, since the election 
of Donald Trump it is unclear what the future of Russian-American relations regarding 
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Syria will look like. Trump has shown a desire to work with Russia, and has lacked a 
consistent policy on Syria.  
Asad’s military has been successful due to the support that Russia has provided 
over the course of the conflict. The Syrian military has been spread thin as it tries to 
fight the opposition in the West and attempts to retake territory from ISIS in the east. As 
the literature on civil war indicates, international involvement often lengthens a conflict 
and Russia’s involvement has done exactly that. Russia’s air support has allowed for 
pro-Asad forces to easily retake territory and devastate cities, as was demonstrated in 
Aleppo. 
Iran and Hezbollah  
Iran has also been a long-time ally of the Asad government and the relationship 
became “solidly cemented in the early 1980s with the formation of Hezbollah.”104 Iran 
and Hezbollah have been traditional allies of Syria in the Axis of Resistance against the 
United States and Israel.105 The Iranian government attempted to reach a deal with the 
Syrian government and told Asad that “it would be wise to hold free and fair 
elections.”106 Both the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition opposed this 
proposal because the government felt that they could stop the revolution and the 
opposition did not trust Iran or the Syrian government.107 Iran’s primary concern is that 
if the Asad government fell, the new government would have stronger ties to the United 
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States and Israel and that therefore Iran’s regional influence would be weakened.108 
Thus, Iran has allied with Russia in order to keep Asad in power and to maintain its 
influence in the Levant. However, Iran is also looking to ensure that it can maintain 
influence in the Levant if Asad does fall by allying with Shia militias from across the 
Middle East. Iran’s staunch support of the Asad government and Shia militias against 
opposition groups supported by Sunni-majority countries reinforces the Sunni-Shia 
divide within the region. These parties are fighting to create a version of Syria that 
benefits them, all the while fighting a Sunni-Shia proxy war. 
While Iran’s involvement in the conflict is known, it is not clear what the scope 
of their involvement is, demonstrating “its ability to work within low-intensity-conflict 
environments while successfully obfuscating details about its operations, as it did in 
Iraq during the latter half of the Iraq War.”109 Iran has provided the Syrian military with 
supplies and training and military assistance to shabiha militias.110 “Iran has conducted 
this foreign internal defense mission in Syria using its regular Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Corps (IRGC) forces alongside the IRGC Quds Force and other clandestine 
services, marking a new kind of Iranian expeditionary military strategy.”111 In the 
beginning of the conflict, Iran’s support focused on counterinsurgency operations as 
Asad was losing territory to opposition groups.112 
 Hezbollah has been involved in the conflict since 2013 and “they have enabled 
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the regime to regain control of rebel-held areas in central Syria and have improved the 
effectiveness of pro-regime forces.”113 Hezbollah provides training to Syria’s National 
Defense Force (NDF) and other pro-government forces, as well as tactical support.114 
Hezbollah fighters have noted that one of the major problems the Syrian military had 
was their lack of training and skill. Hezbollah has increased the effectiveness of the 
Syrian military through training and proved to be especially important as the conflict 
shifted from counterinsurgency to civil war. Hezbollah’s goals in Syria are similar to 
Iran’s in that it would like to maintain the Axis of Resistance and Shia/Alawite 
influence in the Levant. Hezbollah has been assisted by other Shia militias from Iraq.  
Turkey 
 Turkey has provided support to the FSA along with the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, and Qatar.115 Turkey has also worked with the United States on training soldiers 
who have defected from the Syrian military.116 Overall. Turkey’s support has been 
primarily to Sunni opposition groups. Turkey, like Syria’s Arab neighbors, has had 
domestic challenges with the conflict as well. ISIS has carried out attacks in Turkey and 
Turkey has been flooded with refugees. Thus, Turkey and others that support the 
opposition want the outcome of the conflict to be the removal of Bashar al-Asad. 
However, Turkey’s relationship with the United States regarding the Syrian 
conflict has been complicated. As was discussed in the domestic actors chapter, The 
United States has supported the Kurdish-led YPG. Turkey views the YPG as a wing of 
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the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been a threat to Turkish national 
security for several decades. Turkey is concerned that the Kurds in Syria may gain 
autonomy or an independent state and may push for Turkey’s Kurds to join the state. 
Turkey has long been opposed to any kind of Kurdish autonomy as it contradicts the 
idea of Turkish nationalism. 
Turkey has also had a complicated relationship with Russia throughout the 
conflict. In 2017, Turkey, Russia, and Iran partnered in the Astana Peace Talks (which 
are discussed in the peace process section of this chapter); however, relations have been 
tense as Russia supports the YPG, since they view them as key to fighting ISIS.117 
Additionally, Turkish-Russian relations were strained when the Turkish air force shot 
down a Russian plane in 2015. However, Turkey’s new partnership with Russia appears 
to indicate that the Turkish government’s policy has shifted towards accepting a 
settlement where Asad is included. 
The United States 
 The United States has been slightly less involved role than Iran and Russia. In 
the beginning of the conflict, the United States officially supported nonviolent 
resistance by the SNC. In the meantime, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was 
overseeing arms shipments to the FSA.118 A major concern for the United States is the 
spread of terrorism and the popularity of ISIS. The United States views ISIS as a threat 
not only internally, but to its interests abroad. Additionally, the United States’ support 
of the majority-Kurdish SDF has result in tensions between the United States and their 
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NATO ally, Turkey, which strongly opposes the creation of a Kurdish state. The United 
States has maintained limited involvement out of reluctance to get involved in another 
Iraq or Afghanistan. 
Early in the conflict, the Obama Administration called for Asad to step down.119 
However, the Administration did not act on it, nor did it really have any intention on 
acting on it. The Administration supported democratic transition, but as is indicated by 
the diversity of the goals of the Syrian opposition, it was difficult for the Administration 
to back a particular group to ensure democratic transition would take place. The Obama 
Administration also discussed the infamous “red line” regarding Syria’s use of chemical 
weapons, as was discussed in the history section. While the Obama Administration did 
not use military force in response to chemical weapons use, the United States and 
Russia reached an agreement to dispose of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. The 
agreement resulted in “the removal from Syria of 1,300 metric tons of weapons-grade 
chemicals—including ingredients for the nerve agents sarin and VX—as well as the 
destruction of chemical munitions, labs, and mixing equipment.”120 However, it appears 
this deal was allowed to fall apart due to a lack of enforcement mechanism because of 
Russia’s insistence that sanctions could not be used if Syria was found in violation of 
the agreement.121 
The United States’ biggest failure in Syria was its failure to create a cohesive 
moderate opposition group at the start of the conflict. Dr. Joshua Landis argues the 
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United States failed “not because it didn’t try, but because its moderates were 
incompetent and unpopular.”122 While the United States’ reluctance to provide arms and 
funding, or to intervene in the conflict may have contributed to the failure of the 
opposition, the United States was not likely to “buy its way to success” in a fragmented 
society.123 The moderates could not come up with a cohesive vision for Syria’s future, 
while “Assad and ISIS both deploy lots of coercion, corruption and clientelism to hold 
their states together, whether they profess ideologies of secular nationalism or Islamic 
Caliphalism.”124 
The election of Donald Trump signaled a change in policy towards the Syrian 
conflict; however, it is not always clear as to what the United States wants out of the 
conflict. Early in the Administration, Trump and United Nations Ambassador Nikki 
Haley made it clear that defeating ISIS, not removing Asad was the priority.125 After the 
4 April 2017 chemical weapons attacks, the Trump Administration made the decision to 
strike Al Shayrat airfield. This strike along with another statement from Haley indicated 
that the United States felt that there could not be a political solution in which Asad 
remains in power.126 However, with the constant changes in Trump’s foreign policy, it 
is unclear what the United States’ goals for Syria actually are. 
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Saudi Arabia 
 Saudi Arabia believes that Asad cannot be a part of the solution to the conflict. 
Saudi Arabia has provided financial support to opposition groups, including those with 
Islamist leanings, differing from its ally the United States in its support of a democratic 
transition.127 In 2013, Saudi Arabia surpassed Qatar as the main Arab supporter of the 
opposition because they felt that the opposition could defeat Asad, or that they could 
pressure the United States to help the opposition do so.128 In February 2017, Saudi 
Arabia announced that it was prepared to send ground troops to Syria to ensure that 
areas taken from ISIS control would not fall under control of Asad, Iran, or 
Hezbollah.129 Additionally, the Saudi government is hopeful that the Trump 
Administration will engage more in the conflict. Saudi Arabia expressed frustration 
with the United States after it did not intervene militarily in 2013 after Asad crossed 
Obama’s “red line.” 
The Peace Process 
A negotiated settlement has not been reached for lack of trying. For much of the 
civil war, there have been attempts at negotiating a peace deal, however, both the 
opposition and the government have been convinced that they would win, which 
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resulted in both sides unwillingness to negotiate.130 As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the opposition is no longer a homogenous group, which makes negotiating with 
the opposition extremely difficult because it is often that case that many opposition 
groups are not included in the peace talks. Groups such as Jabhat al-Fatah al-Sham and 
Daesh are also not included in peace talks as they are deemed terrorist organizations and 
including them would provide them with a sense of legitimacy many in Syria and the 
international community are reluctant to give them. Efforts led by well known leaders in 
the field of conflict resolution, such as Kofi Annan and Staffan de Mistura, have so far 
resulted in failed or shaky ceasefires that sometimes only hold for a few hours before 
cities descend into violence again. As of the recent Astana talks, the opposition has 
expressed that they are not ready to discuss a political solution until security can be 
maintained with a successful ceasefire.131 Therefore, it appears the cycle of failed peace 
talks will continue for the time being.  
This section will address the various plans for peace that have been proposed 
throughout the conflict and will discuss the reasons for the failure each of the major 
peace talks thus far.  
The Arab League’s Peace Plan 
 The Syrian peace process began early in the conflict with the announcement of a 
peace plan by the Arab League in November 2011. The plan called for the Syrian 
government to “withdraw the army from cities and towns, release all political prisoners, 
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and permit access to members of the media, human rights groups and Arab 
monitors.”132 The Arab League’s decision to interfere with Syria’s domestic politics 
marks a change in traditional Arab League policies. According to Article 8 of the Pact 
of Arab States, the Arab League has maintained the idea that each state should respect 
the form of government of the other member states and “shall pledge itself not to take 
any action tending to change that form.”133 However, in response to the Arab Spring 
uprisings, the Arab League has taken a more active role in domestic politics. The Arab 
League suspended Syria’s membership in order to pressure the government into ending 
the violence. The Arab League also imposed economic and political sanctions, however, 
it did not discuss possible military intervention as it did in the case of intervention in 
Libya.134 
In November 2011, the Syrian government announced that it accepted the terms 
of the Arab League plan. However, the Syrian government quickly failed to abide by 
the terms of the peace plan, which resulted in the suspension of Syria’s Arab League 
Membership and economic sanctions.135 This behavior by the Syrian government would 
be repeated throughout the peace process. In December 2011, the Arab League and 
Syria signed an agreement that would allow observers into the country that would be 
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under the protection of the government. This deal resulted in some concern that the 
observers would not be able to freely document the violence due to pressure by the 
Syrian government.136 The observers were withdrawn from the country by January 2012 
because the situation in Syria was becoming increasingly unsafe for observers. 
Later in January 2012, the Arab League met in Cairo to discuss another plan. 
The League urged Asad to step down and hand over power to his deputy and hoped to 
establish a unity government to bring an end to the civil war, which would then be 
followed by presidential and parliamentary elections.137 This, of course, did not happen 
as Asad was and is unlikely to step down voluntarily. This is why as of 2017, the 
international community has begun to recognize that unless he is removed by force, 
Asad will be a part of the peace process, despite the fact that many in Syria have 
demanded that regime change be a part of Syria’s future.  
The Annan Plan 
 The failed Arab League talks were followed by a six-point proposal by the 
former United Nations Secretary General and the United Nations Special Envoy to 
Syria, Kofi Annan. Annan’s plan (1) highlighted the importance of a Syrian-led peace 
process, (2) urged warring parties to end the fighting, (3) called for steps to be taken to 
ensure humanitarian assistance to all affected areas, (4) called for more “arbitrarily 
detained persons” to be released, (5) ensured the freedom of movement for journalists in 
the country, and (6) called for the government to “respect freedom of association and 
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the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.”138 While these six points laid 
out a more detailed plan than that of the Arab League, like the Arab League plan, the 
Annan plan would only be successful if all parties worked to implement it. Once again, 
a shaky ceasefire was implemented that did not last more than a few days. Asad 
accepted the plan in March 2012, shortly after it was proposed.139 Asad’s acceptance of 
the plan was an important step in the peace process, however, Annan's Six Points were 
never successfully implemented as Asad did not actually comply with the plan. 
Annan resigned from his post as special envoy in August 2012 as a result of the 
failure of the peace plan. In his resignation speech, he blamed the government, 
opposition, and international community for the failure: 
Yet the bloodshed continues, most of all because of the Syrian government’s 
intransigence and continuing refusal to implement the six-point plan, and also because 
of the escalating military campaign of the opposition – all of which is compounded by 
the disunity of the international community.140 
 
Annan’s resignation speech accurately sums of the entirety of the peace process 
from 2011 until 2017. Each party to the conflict is to blame for creating obstacles to a 
peace agreement and everyone wants to place the blame on each other rather than each 
party accepting responsibility for creating obstacles. Syria desperately needs the 
international community to unify in order to place pressure on the warring parties, 
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however, as Annan pointed out “there continues to be finger-pointing and name-calling 
in the Security Council”141  This would not be the last time a leader in the international 
community would place blame on the world powers for failing to resolve Syria’s 
conflict, but this blame has had little effect on the international community over the 
course of the conflict. 
The Geneva Peace Process 
 The first round of peace talks in Geneva convened in 2012 and since then there 
have been two more rounds, with one more taking place in February 2017. The Geneva 
Process is backed by the United Nations, and has demonstrated the differing ideas the 
United States and Russia have for the future of Syria.  Kofi Annan’s Six Point Plan is 
often what is known as Geneva I. Geneva II followed the publication of the Geneva 
Communiqué, which was published in June 2012 and laid out the guidelines for a future 
political transition. The Geneva II process also failed to produce a peace agreement as 
negotiations took place 18 months after the Geneva Communiqué was agreed upon. 
This period allowed for the “continuation of international policies to either arm 
disparate insurgent forces or back the Assad government at all costs, which precluded 
the diplomacy needed to shore up regional and global agreement for a transition.”142 
This worked to encourage groups to keep fighting in order to reach a military solution, 
rather than to work out a much-needed political solution. Additionally, Geneva II failed 
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because of the competing goals of the United States and Russia.143 This demonstrates 
that international cooperation is a key element to the success of the peace process 
despite the fact that any solution should be a Syrian-led initiative. 
 Geneva III was set to begin in February 2016, however, after a few days the 
talks were suspended because the United Nations said the countries backing the 
different actors in the conflict were doing more to fuel the conflict than to work towards 
ending it, as they have done for much of the conflict.144 At Geneva III, de Mistura met 
separately with government representatives and opposition representatives and there 
was no plan for the two sides to meet.145 Due to the fact that the opposition and 
government had no plans to meet during Geneva III, it was unlikely from the start of the 
talks that any significant progress would be made. 
The 2017 Astana Talks 
 The most recent peace talks that were not a part of the Geneva Process, took 
place in Astana, Kazakhstan on 23-24 January 2017 following the fall of Aleppo and an 
apparent military victory by the Syrian government. These talks do not necessarily 
replace the Geneva process, but there is a possibility that they could. However, there is 
some concern that these talks may have a pro-government leaning as the states leading 
the talks are primarily backing the government. The talks were “the first face-to-face 
meeting between Syrian rebel fighters and government officials in nearly six years of 
civil war,” which seemed to cause some to hope that the Astana process could produce a 
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solution.146 However, like the Geneva Process, the talks resulted in quarrelling between 
the two sides.147 This means the Astana Process and Geneva Process are likely to 
continue simultaneously. 
The Astana talks, like those that preceded them, emphasized the need to respect 
Syria's sovereignty. The joint statement by Russia, Iran, and Turkey states: 
Reaffirm their commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, non-sectarian 
and democratic State, as confirmed by the UN Security Council148 
 
This sentiment has been repeated in many of the United Nations Resolutions that have 
resulted from the ongoing peace talks, including Geneva. Throughout the last six years 
of conflict, Asad has expressed his desire to retake the entirety of Syria “without 
hesitation.”149 The emphasis on state unity may be in efforts to eliminate further 
regional destabilization. 
Everyday Syrians have expressed frustration with the recent peace talks in 
Astana. Many feel that it has become a Turkish-Russian matter and that there are too 
many factions within the opposition and the lack of unity means peace talks will not be 
successful.150 However, Syrian scholar Marwan Kabalan has said that these talks may 
be the most serious efforts at reaching a peace agreement for several reasons: (1) the 
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United States are not involved in these talks, so the rivalry between Russia and the 
United States cannot hamper efforts, and (2) The major international actors (Iran, 
Turkey, and Russia) seem to agree, so perhaps the ongoing proxy war is coming to an 
end.151 These factors mostly benefit the Syrian government, rather than the opposition, 
but demonstrate it may be challenging to have a peace process that does not lean 
towards one side or another. While this appears to instill a sense of hope that the 
conflict will end soon through negotiated settlement, this is still an unlikely possibility 
as long as the opposition remains fragmented and international actors are intervening.   
The Astana talks resumed in March 2017, “without any substantive negotiations 
taking place” because opposition leaders boycotted the meetings because Russia had 
failed to uphold a ceasefire agreed to in December 2016.152 It is likely that opposition 
groups will also refuse to attend future Astana talks if a stable ceasefire is not put into 
place. There were rumors that a new constitution was discussed at the second round of 
Astana talks, but the Syrian government says these claims are false.153 
Geneva IV 
 After the first round of the Astana Peace Talks, another round of talks in Geneva 
resumed in February 2017. United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura offered a 
pessimistic outlook on the talks, stating that while he was not expecting a breakthrough, 
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he expected the talks to provide momentum.154 This sentiment echoes many of the 
previous attitudes towards peace talks; that they will not end the conflict, but will 
hopefully provide the momentum to do so. This way of thinking created a cycle in 
which little has been achieved. De Mistura also felt that the opposition and government 
shared “little common ground,” making it challenging to reach any kind of 
compromise.155 The United Nations said that the Geneva IV talks will focus on the 
following: 
the establishment of a credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance; a process for 
drafting a new constitution; and free and fair elections to be held under U.N. 
supervision.156  
 
These goals do not explicitly state maintaining Syrian sovereignty; however, it does 
indicate that the United Nations foresees that Syria will remain a state by hoping to 
establish stable governance through a new constitution and free and fair elections.  
 The most recent round of talks in Geneva has been about as productive as the 
previous three. The government and the opposition are still reluctant to make 
compromises. The Asad government wants to primarily discuss fighting terrorism, 
while the opposition continues to push for discussions on a political transition, 
something that Asad is unlikely to agree to, at least in the near future.157 Additionally, 
De Mistura decided to convene this round in order to discuss UN Security Council 
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Resolution 2254.158 UN Resolution 2254 was adopted on 18 December 2015 and 
focuses on issues of governance, the ongoing humanitarian crisis, and describes that the 
only way to achieve peace is through “an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that 
meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people.”159 Additionally, the resolution 
begins by reaffirming a commitment to Syrian unity, thus emphasizing that partition is 
an option the Security Council is unlikely to pursue.160 However, like Geneva II, this 
may result in failure as it has been almost two years since the resolution was adopted. 
Future Peace Talks 
 March 2017 will mark the sixth anniversary of the Syrian conflict with still no 
political solution in sight as negotiators keep encountering obstacles as both sides refuse 
to meet or make compromises. De Mistura has called for the peace process to speed up, 
but, as long as the parties continue to approach negotiations in the same ways as they 
have done in the past it is unlikely that they will speed up or yield any positive results in 
the near future.161 Russia, Turkey, and Iran--the sponsors of the Astana talks--have 
agreed to meet again on 3-4 May 2017. The Astana talks appear to be an unlikely 
candidate to produce a solution that will appease the government and opposition groups, 
since they are sponsored by two (possibly three with Turkey’s recent shift in policy) 
pro-Asad states. However, Great Britain’s special representative for Syria, Gareth 
Bayley, has said that if the Astana talks can produce a lasting ceasefire, it could replace 
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the Geneva process in the future. However, a stable ceasefire is only a short-term 
solution, and the Astana talks may not produce an outcome that works for both the 
government and opposition. 
Conclusion 
 International support has greatly weakened the unity of the opposition. In the 
beginning of the conflict, many deemed it necessary because many opposition groups 
lacked the funding, legitimacy, and experience in creating political institutions that they 
need to be successful.162 However, international involvement also strengthened the 
Asad government and has worked to extend the length of the conflict. This fits in the 
framework established by existing civil war literature that says international 
involvement prolongs civil wars and that international actors act as spoilers to the peace 
process. 
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Chapter 4: Analysis and Conclusions 
One of the biggest uncertainties about the conflict is how and when it will end. 
Civil wars in the Middle East “have consistently behaved much like other civil wars 
across the globe over the past century,” therefore civil war literature can explain what 
we can expect from the Syrian conflict.163 Pollack and Walter state that there are two 
paths “to bring an early and permanent end to civil wars:” negotiated settlement and 
decisive military victory.164 The following chapter will analyze these potential civil war 
outcomes in the context of the Syrian conflict and what their effects on the post-conflict 
Syrian state and society will be. While these two paths are for an early end to civil wars, 
civil war literature and the events of the conflict thus far indicate that there will not be 
an early end to the conflict. However, negotiated settlement and military victory are still 
the two most likely outcomes of the Syrian conflict. It is  unlikely that there will be a 
permanent end to the conflict in the near future. This analysis will indicate what the 
international community can expect from the Syrian conflict and that the outcome may 
not match the desired outcome for much of the international community. It is possible 
that the conflict, at least at this point (April 2017), will end in a decisive Asad military 
victory, followed by a violent period as Asad attempts to regain control over the whole 
country and suppress any uprising or opposition.  Thus, the world should be prepared 
for any possible outcome.  
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Two Paths to Ending the Conflict 
Negotiated Settlement 
 For many, negotiated settlement is the ideal solution to the Syrian conflict 
because it “(a) stops the fighting, reducing the threat of spillover and contagion, (b) 
avoids post victory reprisals, and (c) prevents one’s enemy from gaining full control 
over the government.”165 However, it is also the most unlikely outcome as six years of 
negotiations have yielded little progress and are currently in a stalemate. This is due to 
the fact that in civil wars “the government usually holds a disproportionate share of the 
bargaining leverage” and “since most governments have a standing army, they are 
better equipped to impose their most preferred outcome through the use of force.”166 
Additionally, the Syria case fails to meet the three conditions that make negotiated 
settlement possible.167 
As the events of the peace process indicate, negotiated settlement is highly 
unlikely as the major domestic actors have refused to meet with each other over the last 
round of peace talks. Former President Jimmy Carter argues that negotiated settlement 
is not a possibility at all until all sides put a stop to the violence and that this should be 
the common goal for all sides.168 Carter also argues that the international actors 
involved must work to negotiate.169 Under the current United States Administration, this 
appeared to be a possibility until relations between Russia and the United States were 
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strained when the Trump Administration reacted to the 4 April 2017 chemical weapons 
attack by bombing a Syrian airbase. However, even if the United States and Russia 
work together in the negotiation process, Russia is unlikely to support regime change 
since keeping Asad in power is their primary goal. In addition to the failure of the peace 
process, many actors, especially those who support the opposition, have shifted their 
focus from removing Asad to defeating ISIS. This has allowed Asad and the Syrian 
government to continue to wage war against the opposition and civilians without any 
international power or unified force to challenge him. 
Barbara Walter’s research on civil wars indicates that this is typical of civil 
wars. She found that “between 1940 and 1900 enemies in civil wars almost always 
failed to reach successful negotiated solutions to their conflicts unless an outside power 
guaranteed the safety of the belligerents during the ensuing transition period.”170 So far, 
none of the states supporting the opposition have pledged to protect them in a transition 
period, and if Asad is part of the solution the opposition is likely to face continued 
violence.  
Decisive Military Victory 
 Despite the fact that in 2016 it looked as if an Asad victory was highly unlikely, 
as of April 2017, it appears that decisive military victory is the most likely outcome for 
the conflict. The aid of Russia, Iran, and Shia militias such as Hezbollah, gave Asad the 
upper hand militarily in the conflict and overall international involvement fueled the 
continuation of the conflict and created a divided and weak opposition. The opposition 
is too disorganized to rally together to remove Asad or to pressure the government for a 
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negotiated settlement. Thus, since Asad is winning, he has no incentive to even attempt 
to negotiate with the opposition, meaning that it is likely that he will continue to wage 
war until he has retaken territory in the west from the opposition. 
 While Asad’s behavior and his place in a post-conflict Syrian state has been 
deemed unacceptable by the international community, the international community 
should not discount the possibility that Asad may win and retain power. Thus, the 
international community must be prepared that this a potential outcome to the conflict. 
An Asad victory does not necessarily indicate the end of the conflict. A decisive 
military victory for Asad means that he is likely to remain in power until his death like 
his father. This will not come peacefully; Asad is likely to do everything in his power to 
ensure that another Arab Spring uprising does not occur and will punish those who 
supported the opposition. Middle Eastern expert Maysam Behravesh explained what to 
expect from post-conflict Syria if Asad wins: 
Even if Assad wins the war, he will lose the peace afterwards. He will have to deal with 
emerging pockets of rebellion and resistance. This is to say that either the Syrian civil 
war could persist unabated for years to come, wreaking havoc in its wake, as it has so 
far. Or it will break down into a series of destabilizing yet resilient insurgencies, similar 
to what we saw in post-invasion Iraq, where the outcome was nothing but insecurity and 
terrorism. The fact of the matter, however, is that under the existing circumstances, 
Syria without Assad, whether it be it through his personal resignation or negotiations for 
political transition, elections or referendum, is far from realistic and plausible. In a 
nutshell, I don’t see a bright future for Syria.171     
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UN Special Envoy Stefan de Mistura stated in late 2016 that low-intensity 
conflict is likely to continue in the event of an Asad victory.172 Using Iraq as a model 
for Syria, he also argued that more people would join ISIS, as a violent, military victory 
would not win people over and that the only way to prevent this is to have a political 
solution with those who feel disenfranchised by the Asad government.173 However, in 
the event of an Asad victory, it is unlikely that he will try to work with those who feel 
disenfranchised. It is likely that ISIS will then become what Stanislawski calls and 
“almost-state”  as Asad only needs to contain ISIS and not totally defeat it.174 Therefore, 
Asad only needs to win the war in the west to have a decisive military victory. The 
Syrian government’s war against ISIS in the east may continue, or he will simply try to 
contain them to a manageable area. It will be extremely challenging for Asad to defeat 
ISIS as Iraq is still extremely unstable and the Iraqi government is still working to 
liberate cities from the organization. 
 Pollack and Walter’s research on civil wars indicates that while decisive military 
victory is the fastest way to end a war, it is not necessarily the best as it comes “at the 
price of horrific (even genocidal) levels of violence against the defeated, including their 
civilian populations.”175 The Syria case fits this understanding of civil wars as can be 
seen in the events in the battle for Aleppo in 2016 that shifted the outcome of the civil 
war in Asad’s favor.  
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Will the conflict end soon? 
 Pollack and Walter explain that the Syrian conflict has been especially difficult 
to end because “(1) the incumbent regime is deeply unpopular and represents only a 
minority of the population, (2) the opposition is heavily factionalized, and (3) Syria has 
no history of ethnic/sectarian compromise.”176 These factors paired with international 
support for opposition groups and the government has caused the civil war to last 
longer. 
Conclusions: What can we expect from a post-conflict Syria? 
 Lessons from previous civil wars and scholarship on civil wars indicates that the 
Syrian conflict is likely to end in an Asad military victory, however, this will not 
necessarily be in the next year or near future. This will be followed by a period of 
continued instability in the country as frustrated Sunnis flock to join ISIS and the Asad 
government crushes any uprisings or opposition. The state will also go through the 
difficult process of reconstruction, which is a process that is likely to be prolonged due 
to continued instability. 
If Asad wins, it is likely that he and those in his military and government who 
have perpetrated war crimes against innocent civilians will not be brought to trial in an 
international court. The victims of chemical weapons attacks, barrel bombs, and torture 
by the mukhabarat will most likely not receive some solace in the fact that perpetrators 
of these crimes will be brought to justice. 
Syria will also be faced with the challenge of post-conflict reconstruction. This 
will be a challenging process under an Asad victory as it will likely be unsafe for aid 
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workers to enter the country as ISIS continues to exist, other organizations commit 
terrorist attacks, and the government works to consolidate power. Infrastructure has 
crumbled because of the conflict--many areas need access to power, clean water, and 
food, among other things. Reconstruction will be extremely costly and require the 
support of the international community and organizations such as the World Bank. 
Additionally, the international community must also be prepared to continue to deal 
with the Syrian refugee crisis as refugees are unlikely to be willing to return to Syria 
and more refugees will flood Turkey, Europe, and other parts of the world. This will 
require countries to begin to integrate refugees into their economies and to contribute to 
the UNHCR and other aid organizations. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that Syria will see peace immediately after the end of 
the conflict. The international community must acknowledge that negotiated settlement 
may not be a reality and be prepared for an Asad victory and an extremely violent post-
conflict Syrian state. While this analysis predicts a bleak outcome for the post-conflict 
Syrian state, Syria’s case could provide important lessons for future conflicts of this 
nature.  
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